Security Considerations
Securing FERIN registers: authentication, authorization, data protection, and threat modeling for enterprise and government deployments.
Security Overview
Registers often contain sensitive or business-critical data. This guide covers security considerations for protecting register content, operations, and user access.
Authentication
Verifying who users are
Authorization
Controlling what users can do
Data Protection
Protecting content at rest and in transit
Audit & Compliance
Recording and monitoring activity
Authentication Patterns
Choose authentication based on your user community and risk profile.
Pattern Comparison
| Pattern | Complexity | Security | Best For |
|---|---|---|---|
| API Keys | Low | Medium | Server-to-server, internal tools |
| Username/Password | Low | Low-Medium | Simple applications, low risk |
| OAuth 2.0 / OIDC | Medium | High | User-facing apps, SSO integration |
| SAML 2.0 | High | High | Enterprise SSO, federated identity |
| mTLS | High | Very High | Government, financial, high-security |
OAuth 2.0 Implementation
For user-facing applications, OAuth 2.0 with OIDC is recommended:
// Authorization Code Flow with PKCE
1. User redirects to authorization server
2. User authenticates and consents
3. Authorization server returns code
4. Application exchanges code for tokens
5. Access token used for API requests
// Token structure
{
"sub": "user-123", // Subject (user ID)
"iss": "https://auth.example.com", // Issuer
"aud": "https://api.example.com", // Audience
"exp": 1704067200, // Expiration
"roles": ["proposer", "viewer"],
"org": "acme-corp"
}mTLS for High Security
For government or high-security deployments, mutual TLS provides strong authentication:
- Client certificates issued by trusted CA
- Certificate validates at TLS handshake
- Certificate attributes map to authorization
- No tokens or credentials in application layer
Authorization Model
FERIN defines specific roles that map to authorization permissions.
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
Anonymous / Public
Unauthenticated access to public resources
- Read published items (if access commitment allows)
- View public metadata
- No write operations
Proposer
Can submit proposals for changes
- All public access
- Submit proposals
- View own proposals
- Modify own draft proposals
Register Manager
Day-to-day operations
- All proposer access
- Validate proposals
- Manage operational settings
- View all proposals
Control Body
Approves or rejects proposals
- All manager access
- Approve/reject proposals
- Provide decision rationale
- Delegate within scope
Register Owner
Full administrative access
- All control body access
- Assign roles
- Modify register configuration
- Handle appeals
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)
For fine-grained control, use ABAC to consider additional attributes:
// ABAC policy example
policy proposal_submit:
condition:
user.role: proposer
user.org_verified: true
item.status: published OR user.is_owner
policy proposal_approve:
condition:
user.role: control_body
user.org: proposal.target_org
NOT user.is_proposer_for(proposal)Data Protection
Encryption in Transit
All API communication must use TLS 1.2 or higher:
- Enforce HTTPS for all endpoints
- Use HSTS headers to prevent downgrade attacks
- Configure strong cipher suites
- Implement certificate pinning for mobile/native apps
Encryption at Rest
Protect sensitive data stored in databases and files:
| Data Type | Protection | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Item content | Application-level encryption | For highly sensitive content |
| User credentials | Bcrypt/Argon2 hashing | Never store plaintext |
| API keys | Hashed or encrypted | Display only once on creation |
| Audit logs | Integrity protection (HMAC) | Prevent tampering |
| Database | TDE or volume encryption | Defense in depth |
Personal Data Protection
When registers contain personal data, implement GDPR/privacy compliance:
- Data minimization: collect only necessary data
- Retention policies: define and enforce retention periods
- Right to access: users can view their data
- Right to erasure: implement redaction capabilities
- Consent management: track consent for processing
Audit Logging
Comprehensive audit logs are essential for governed registers.
What to Log
Authentication Events
- Login attempts (success/failure)
- Token issuance and refresh
- Password changes
- Session termination
Authorization Events
- Access denied events
- Role assignments/changes
- Permission modifications
Data Events
- Item create/update/delete
- Status changes
- Proposal submissions
- Decision records
Administrative Events
- Configuration changes
- Role management
- System maintenance
Log Format
{
"timestamp": "2024-01-15T10:30:00Z",
"eventId": "evt_abc123",
"eventType": "ITEM_UPDATE",
"actor": {
"userId": "user-123",
"role": "proposer",
"ipAddress": "192.168.1.100",
"userAgent": "Mozilla/5.0..."
},
"resource": {
"type": "RegisterItem",
"id": "rum:m",
"version": "2.0.0"
},
"action": "UPDATE",
"outcome": "SUCCESS",
"details": {
"fields": ["definition"],
"proposalId": "prop_456"
}
}Log Protection
- Store logs in append-only storage
- Use HMAC or digital signatures for integrity
- Replicate to separate, secure storage
- Define retention periods based on requirements
- Restrict log access to authorized personnel
Threat Modeling
Consider these threat categories when designing your register security:
Unauthorized Access
Threat: Attacker gains access to restricted data.
Mitigations:
- Strong authentication (MFA)
- Principle of least privilege
- Regular access reviews
- Session timeouts
Data Tampering
Threat: Attacker modifies register content.
Mitigations:
- Integrity-protected audit logs
- Digital signatures on critical items
- Change detection monitoring
- Regular integrity checks
Denial of Service
Threat: Attacker makes register unavailable.
Mitigations:
- Rate limiting
- Traffic filtering
- Auto-scaling
- CDN for read traffic
Insider Threat
Threat: Authorized user abuses access.
Mitigations:
- Segregation of duties
- Audit all actions
- Regular access reviews
- Anomaly detection
Data Exfiltration
Threat: Sensitive data stolen in bulk.
Mitigations:
- Data classification
- Export controls
- DLP monitoring
- Encryption
Supply Chain
Threat: Compromise via dependencies.
Mitigations:
- Dependency scanning
- SBOM maintenance
- Vendor assessment
- Patch management
Security Checklist
Authentication
- ☐ MFA enabled for admin roles
- ☐ Strong password policy enforced
- ☐ Session timeout configured
- ☐ Failed login lockout enabled
Authorization
- ☐ RBAC implemented per FERIN roles
- ☐ Least privilege enforced
- ☐ Regular access review scheduled
- ☐ API rate limiting configured
Data Protection
- ☐ TLS 1.2+ enforced
- ☐ Sensitive data encrypted at rest
- ☐ Encryption keys rotated
- ☐ Backup encryption enabled
Monitoring
- ☐ Audit logging enabled
- ☐ Log integrity protected
- ☐ Alerting for suspicious activity
- ☐ Incident response plan defined